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of love. Lucas further argues that if God is personal, God is rational, although
also inscrutable, which gives rise to the need for revelation. God cannot be
simply the God of the philosophers, but "he must be also the God of Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob, and the Father of Jesus."
Soskice has a useful and salutary essay defending the theological realist's
use of metaphor to describe God. The realist insists on divine realities while
conceding our inability to catch them with our theological formulations. On
the other hand, instrumentalists, e.g., Feuerbach, Cupitt, (and Kaufman?) take
theological formulations to be action-guiding but not referential in the traditional sense. Soskice suggests that the contrast parallels the realist-instrumentalist contrast in the philosophy of science, and she goes on to propose
plausible ways of supposing that religious talk, for all its metaphors, cultureboundedness, etc., may be "reality-depicting." Such a realist need not be the
hard-line dogmatist feared by Kaufman; she might be well aware of and even
agree with the kinds of considerations that sway instrumentalists-the pervasiveness of metaphor, the ties to social and cultural contexts, and the
expectation of future changes in vocabulary-while remaining consistent in
her realism.
The other essays in this volume, especially those by Harre and Dummett,
are stimulating, and all warrant additional examination and criticism. This
Festschrift comprises a fitting tribute to Basil Mitchell and his contributions
to philosophy of religion.
Faith After Foundationalism, by D. Z. Phillips. London and New York:
Routledge, 1988. Pp. xviii and 341. $35.

J. KELLENBERGER, California State University, Northridge.
This book will be loved and hated. It is vintage Phillips, a further development of some of the ideas that he has expounded and championed in earlier
books. There is some that is new in nuance and much that is new in the focus
of his concern, but there is no great change in philosophical direction. Those
who find a strength in Phillips' approach to philosophy of religion will find
that strength again in this book. Similarly, those who fail to find a strength
in his approach will not be disappointed. For those sympathetic to Phillips'
Neo-Wittgensteinianism and interested in its development, this book will
provide Phillips' thinking about recent turns in reflection on religion, notably
"Reformed Epistemology," but more too. For those not sympathetic or not
acquainted with Phillips' thinking, it will provide a readable opportunity to
enhance their philosophical literacy regarding what is undeniably a significant mode of contemporary philosophy of religion. Accordingly, I recom-
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mend Phillips' new book to all: it is not a book to be received with indifference.
Phillips' book is divided into four parts. Let me say a little about the content
of each of these four parts before I go on to raise some criticisms and to say
what I think is the book's primary virtue. Part One is the longest, taking up
nine of the book's twenty-two chapters. The entire book is an examination
of philosophical, sociological, and theological reflection on religion after the
passing from favor (among many) of foundationalism. In this first part Phillips looks at Plantinga' s rejection of classical foundationalism and argues that
Plantinga nevertheless remains "within a foundationalist tradition" (p. xiv).
Arguably this is correct regarding the author of "Reason and Belief in God,"
one of the two articles by Planting a that Phillips cites. Phillips wrote this
boo,k in 1985-86 and does not address Plantinga's more recent thinking, such
as his view that rationality has to do with the proper functioning of our
faculties, nor does he examine William Alston's reliability-of-practices view,
although he criticizes some of Alston's comments in "Christian Experience
and Christian Belief," in which Alston develops this view. Phillips' main
philosophical target in Part One is Plantinga and his "foundationalist" view.
Plantinga goes wrong, Phillips believes, in great part because he fails to
appreciate Wittgenstein's insights, and he brings out this point by contrasting
Plantinga's thinking with Wittgenstein's. For instance, for Wittgenstein our
religious practices and beliefs have and need no "external justification." For
him, while there are "basic propositions" in religion they are basic in being
"held fast by all that surrounds them" (p. 123), not in being the bases on
which religious belief rests, For Wittgenstein, there is no metaphysical "underpinning" to religion, no question about the basis on which religion rests,
no question about an ontological reality that exists independently of
believers' way of life. On all of these points Wittgenstein and Plantinga
diverge. Plantinga is trying to show that Christians have a right to believe as
they do, but, as Phillips sees it, the proper function of philosophy is not to
justify, but to try to clarify through analysis and description (pp. 95-96, 113,
and passim).
In chapters 10, 11, and 12 of Part 1\\'0 Phillips deals with the views of
Richard Rorty in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. For Rorty, "our certainty will be a matter of conversation between persons" (p. 143). Also, in
his view, "the fall of foundational epistemology ... has the beneficial consequence of 'preventing man from deluding himself with the notion that he
knows himself, or anything else, except under optional descriptions'" (p.
149). The first does not hold for even talk about "tables and chairs," nor, for
different reasons, does it hold for "our talk of God" (p. 146), Phillips argues.
The second may hold for matters of taste, where "talk of options is at home"
(p. 151), but it does not hold for morality or for "obeying the eternal will of
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God," which will hardly be seen as optional by the religious believer, Phillips
observes (p. 152). While Rorty may be correct in saying there can be no
reference to "eternal standards," Phillips allows, he is wrong in seeing himself
as aligned with Wittgenstein on these points, and he is wrong, and unWittgensteinian, in his "relativistic conception of knowledge as consensus opinion" (p. 164). In the remaining two chapters of Part 1\vo Phillips criticizes
Peter Berger's sociological view of religion, which, as Phillips sees it, does
not heed the "grammar" of religious concepts, but instead offers "four metaphysical abstractions": that man is the inventor of meanings, which coerce
him because he desires to be accepted by a group in order to gain protection
against anomy (p. 171).
In Part Three Phillips treats the thought of two post-foundationalist theologians who have been influenced by Wittgenstein: George Lindbeck and Paul
Holmer. Lindbeck cites Wittgensteinian categories, but goes astray, Phillips
argues: Lindbeck thinks, for instance, that the form of life category can allow
that religious stories are "intrasystemically [and] ontologically true" (p. 214).
No, says Phillips: the question of truth can arise only within a form of life.
(I am not sure that the two points are not compatible, but I shall not pursue
it.) Holmer does better. He, for instance, fully appreciates "the internal relations between the meanings and the use of words" (p. 246), an important
Wittgensteinian dictum for Phillips.
These first three parts are mainly directed against various views. In Part
Four, in a positive application of his Neo-Wittgensteinian approach, Phillips
examines the "formation" of religious concepts, in particular the concept of
mystery. Here, I would say, Phillips is at his best. He is not primarily battling
errant, "confused," views nor prosecuting heretical versions ofWittgenstein's
teachings, but doing what he sees as the task of philosophy: descriptively
probing religious practice in order to clarify it. (At the end I shall return to
an edifying instance of this.)
A number of questions might be raised about Phillips' book. For one thing,
although he now refers to "the heterogeneity within Christianity" (p. 239),
he still refers to "believers" (e.g., pp. 71 and 203-04) and tells us authoritatively what they are doing and how they will react to this and that-as though
they were a tight little band that lived near Swansea, with which he is in
constant and favored touch. Second, related to this, we should observe that,
following Rush Rhees, Phillips allows that doctrinal conflicts are "grammatical conflicts," Le., conflicts over the rules for the use of religious concepts
(p. 216). Why, then, we might ask, can there not be various religious ways
of life with different grammars? If so, perhaps there is one that corresponds
to the Reformed epistemologist's conceptions, in which it is meaningful to
try to show that one's religious practices relate to an ontological being that
exists independently of those practices. Third, Phillips regularly rejects views
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by, finally, appealing to some Wittgensteinian principle. Thus, he rejects
Alston's idea that an epistemic practice is "innocent until proven guilty" on
the Wittgensteinian grounds that our epistemic practices are "simply there"
and it makes "no sense" to call them innocent or guilty (p. 25) and he rejects
Berger's claims because, while Berger cites uses of language, they are instances of "language idling" (p. 168). Such reasons, though they help us
understand at least Phillips' Neo-Wittgensteinianism (and that is worth something, as I said earlier), probably settle little philosophical hash. Phillips, by
the way, adds a nuance to his Neo-Wittgensteinianism, and to the kind of
criticism he brings against Alston (a criticism that is related to the
Wittgensteinian idea that philosophy describes but does not justify "forms of
life") when he observes that Wittgenstein did allow that religious practices
themselves can be confused: the example is that of scapegoating in Leviticus
(p. 307: the reference is to a MS by Wittgenstein). This seems to allow that
there may be a point to defending religious practices after all (against "confusion," at any rate). Phillips does not comment on the connection. Fourth,
although Phillips insists that philosophy is not in the business of refuting
theories, and "there are no theories in philosophy" (p. 201), and even though
he says his book could equally well be entitled Against Theory (p. 195), he
is himself offering what looks to be a theory of religion, parts of which are
his brand of non-cognitivism (p. 204), his and Wittgenstein's "regulating"
view of religious belief (p. 71), the view that religious belief is "groundless"
(pp. 125-26), and the view that God is not an object or being (p. 204). Again,
he argues against other theories. 1rue, he does not argue that they are false;
he does not argue that they are mistaken, but that they are "confused." Still
his aim looks like refutation.
Also a question can be raised about Phillips' treatment of the subject of
self-deception. Reformed epistemology, he says, sees non-religious noetic
structures as deficient. I think Phillips is right that, for those following Calvin,
there should be something fundamentally amiss in not acknowledging God.
For Calvin it is sin that leads to a denial of the sense of God, and, as Phillips
sees, for Reformed thinking (and for a wider tradition of which it is a part,
we may add) sin amounts to self-deception (p. 102). So Reformed thinkers
like Cornelius Van Til see all unbelievers as self-deceived. But their reasons
for saying this, Phillips argues, are not general enough or are question begging. Phillips apparently thinks that some believers and some unbelievers
may well be self-deceived and some on both sides may well not be. So, who
is right? What is needed is some understanding of the logic of self-deception.
There is such a logic, as Phillips sees it, and he refers us to his and Ilham
Oilman's Sense and Delusion (p. 102, n. 8). But he cites no point of that logic
that would support his claim against Van Til's. Later (pp. 121-22) he introduces a different "context" of talk about self-deception, for which his earlier
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criticisms do not apply, he says. This is where someone who was deceiving
himself says, for instance, "All those years I thought I knew what love was,
but I was deceiving myself. Now I see what love really is." In the first context,
for the first "kind" of self deception, showing that a person was self-deceived
depends on showing that "throughout the years he had not really wanted what
he said he wanted." Regarding the second kind of self-deception it does make
sense for believers to claim that all unbelievers are self-deceived, for Phillips,
since what is involved here is not changing an "opinion" within a "set of
values," but "changing as a person" by gaining a new understanding of, e.g.,
what love is. However it is not clear that all cases of the first "kind" are cases
of one's not really wanting what one says one wants-perhaps there are some
self-deceived about God who really want there to be no God. Again it is not
clear that there are two basic kinds of cases here. Perhaps both should be
subsumed under a general analysis of self-deception, as they would be under
the view of self-deception as a willful suppression of what would lead one
to a painful recognition. Moreover, having the logic of self-deception before
ourselves should help one in thinking about the challenge to religious belief
of projection views, such as Freud's and Berger's. (Phillips does not speak
of "projection," but sees that Berger has this kind of view (p. 178). While
Freud was antireligion, Berger of course is not. Both Freud in The Future of
an Illusion and Berger in The Sacred Canopy, it should be noted, appreciate
that it does not follow from a belief's being a projection that it is false. It
would follow, though, that such beliefs are irrational or non-rational.) All
Phillips can say, in a way echoing A. J. Ayer on moral disputes, is that it is
"totalitarian on either side of the fence" for belief to accuse unbelief and for
unbelief to accuse belief of "rationalisation" (p. 108).
The strongest part of Phillips' book, to my way of thinking, is the last part,
where he is concerned with religious "concept-formation." Here he conveys
a sense of how certain experiences in the world can vivify religious belief.
At one point he draws upon the work of Jacob Fries. Fries describes an
incident in his life in which he and some others are in a small open boat off
a rocky cliff when a storm overtakes them. The sea quickly comes up and
the little boat is thrown about as the waves crash against the cliff. Up one
wave and down another they are flung. As the oarsmen strive against the
raging sea, Fries is struck by the thought of God's omnipotence, and in the
midst of his danger he becomes newly aware of God's inscrutable will (pp.
280-81). It is in settings such as these, Phillips suggests, that one comes to
a sense that one's life is in the hands of God. I think that all of this is useful.
It is not only in the distant past that believers have come to a new sense of
God's presence. "The sense of belief in God is itself rooted in reactions such
as reactions to the storm," Phillips says. And this too is good, although
Phillips does not tell us whether he means "rooted" in the wayan irrational
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reaction is rooted in experience, or rooted in the way a belief can be grounded
in experience, or rooted in some other way. In a further commentary on the
storm episode Phillips says that "the notion of God's will is formed, not in
a search for explanations, but in the abandonment of explanations." When in
such a storm situation one realizes there is an absence of anything to show
why one should perish or not one comes to a sense of being at Gods mercy
and, through it, to a sense of wonder at the contingency of life. In this way
there is a "dying to the understanding." Phillips goes on (pp. 283-89) to
explore this "dying to the understanding" in a different setting, involving
one's relation to others. Here he uses to good effect the episode of Mrs.
Thrpin's revelation, in Flannery O'Connor's short story.
In these discussions we have Phillips consulting and describing aspects of
religious life. Here he is doing the "looking" that Wittgenstein recommended,
and the results are edifying. This is not to say that we should accept his
descriptions as definitive or, indeed, any of his commentary, nor that we
should reject it. Descriptions usually have a point and the point can skew
them, and the lessons drawn from them can be off or just right. These are
matters for reflection. But the substance of the descriptions remains as nourishment for philosophical reflection.
On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, by Luis de Molina,
translated, with an introduction and notes, by Alfred J. Freddoso. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1988. Pp. xii and 286. $34.95.

WILLIAM HASKER, Huntington College.
To refer to this volume as Freddoso's "translation" of Molina is correct but
woefully inadequate. Freddoso's 81-page Introduction is not only a superb
commentary on the late-medieval controversy over foreknowledge and middle knowledge; it is also a major philosophical work in its own right. My
recommendation to the reader is that she begin by reading the first three
sections of the Introduction (deferring sections 4 and 5) as rapidly as possible
so as to provide orientation for the sixteenth-century controversy. Then, she
should carefully work through the translation, finally returning for a leisurely
re-reading of the entire Introduction for its original philosophical insights. In
this review I shall comment briefly on the translation, and then more in detail
on Freddoso's Introduction.
In his preface, Freddoso notes that the has resisted the temptation to divide
Molina's very long sentences (a topic of complaint even in the sixteenth
century!) into shorter ones, because "after several attempts at it, I become
convinced that I could not do this without altering the sense of the original"
(p. x). In spite of this, Freddoso has achieved a remarkable clarity in his

